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Abstract
Objective – The objective of this paper is to provide a discussion whether Islamic securities enjoy
larger demands than conventional securities. This paper also investigate whether regulator could
effectively take a role in materializing demands for Islamic securities and whether regulator
declaration is more convincing than sharia compliance declaration by another institution.
Methods - We employ differences in differences (DID) regression to see the immediate, medium,
and long term market response to this announcement. We also estimate cumulative abnormal
returns by employing the standard market model for the robustness test.
Results - We find that market reacts to sharia compliance declaration by regulator in the long-run,
hence potential demands are realized and the Islamic securities will enjoy greater market power.
We also provide evidence that Islamic investors are not too strict in screening Islamic securities
and are willing to accept different opinions regarding sharia compliance.
Conclusion - This finding could explain why Islamic finance is still growing rapidly even though
there are critiques in the genuineness of sharia compliance of the current Islamic financial
products/services.
Keywords : Regulator, Islamic securities, sharia compliance, demand, investor confidence
Abstrak
Tujuan - Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengkaji apakah surat berharga syariah (Islam) memperoleh
lebih banyak permintaan dibanding surat berhaga konvensional. Tulisan ini juga ingin mengetahui
apakah pihak regulator dapat mengambil peran secara efektif dalam mendukung permintaan surat
berharga syariah dan apakah informasi yang dikeluarkan regulator lebih meyakinkan dibanding
infomasi kepatuhan syariah oleh isntitusi lain.
Metodologi - Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis kuantitatif dengan regresi Differences in
differences (DID) untuk melihat respon pasar pasca pengumuman dikeluarkannya surat berharga
dari regulator. Penelitian ini juga mengestimasi cummulative abnormal returns dengan
mengembangkan model standar untuk test robustness.
Hasil - Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa pasar merespon informasi kepatuhan syariah yang
dikeluarkan regulator dalam jangka pnjan. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat permintaan yang
potesial. Peneliti juga menemukan bahwa investor surat berharga syariah (islam) tidak terlalu
ketat dalam menyeleksi surat berharga dan menerima perbedaan pendapat dalam hal kepatuhan
syariah.
Kesimpulan - penelitian ini dapat menjelaskan alasan bahwa keuangan islam masih tumbuh
dengan cepat walaupun terdapat kritik atas kepatuhan syariah dari produk dan jasa keuangan Islam.
Kata kunci : Regulator, surat berharga Islam, kepatuhan syariah, permintaan, kepercayaan investor
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1. Introduction
In the last decades, we witness rapid increase in market share of Islamic finance.
Kassim (2010) find that total market of Islamic securities grows about 15-20 percent
annually and the market share of Islamic finance will increase further due to the rapid
growth of Islamic banking and finance industry. She also estimates that Islamic equity
funds will reach 1 trillion USD by the end of 2010, while the conventional equity markets
remain stagnant because the prolonged affects of the U.S. and Europe financial crisis. The
Islamic finance is also growing faster in the majority Muslim countries. Beck, Kunt, and
Merrouche (2010) find that the market share of Islamic banks in majority Muslim
countries reached about 16 percent in 2005, increasing rapidly from only about 6 percent
in 1994, while the market share of Islamic banks in global market had reached 2 percent.
Data shows that the number of institutions trying to access funds through issuing
Islamic securities/funds is increasing. The International Organization for Securities
Commission (IOSCO) reports that there were 100 Islamic equity funds worldwide with
assets estimated around 3.3 billion USD in 2003 and their assets grew about 25 percent in
the past seven years. Cakir and Raei (2007) find that sukuk (Islamic bonds) issuance was
also increasing rapidly and globally, it grew around 45 percent in 2006. Godlewski, Ariss,
and Weill (2010) point out that sukuk Issuance in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCG) countries grew quickly from only 7.2 billion USD in 2004 to
39 billion USD in 2007; with global sukuk outstanding was around 90 billion USD.
Increasing interest from financial institutions and companies in utilizing Islamic
securities is because of the advantages offered by the Islamic securities. One main
advantage of the Islamic securities compared to the conventional securities is their wider
demands because Islamic securities are able to meet both demands for Islamic and
conventional securities.
Tazkia Islamic Finance and Business Review | Volume 7.1.
123
There are two necessary conditions should be fulfilled to exercise the demand for
Islamic securities. Otherwise, Islamic securities will fail to offer their main advantage
which is to provide larger market demands. The first condition is that the demands for
Islamic securities do exist. If the demands for Islamic securities are only a Fata Morgana,
ultimately there will be no relative benefit to issue Islamic securities. The second
condition is that investors do believe that Islamic securities do comply with sharia,
otherwise Islamic investors will not buy this kind of Islamic securities. Hence, demands
for Islamic securities will only become potential demands and we can never observe them
in the market.
There are some qualitative studies criticizing sharia compliance of Islamic
securities. Beck, Kunt, and Merrouche (2010) point out anecdotal evidence that almost all
of conventional securities could be reengineered to comply with sharia, therefore there
are almost no different between Islamic securities and conventional securities. Nagaoka
(2007) argue that murabahah contracts, which are very close to interest-based practices,
dominate Islamic finance since the establishment Islamic banks in the 1970s, even though
long before that, there were consensus among Islamic scholars that Islamic finance should
be base on profit-sharing contracts and many Islamic scholars currently only allow
murabahah as a tool to escape from riba, when profit-sharing contracts are not feasible.
Besides to develop Islamic capital market’s infrastructure, other important
regulator role in developing Islamic capital market is to ensure sharia compliance of
Islamic securities and to convince investors regarding this compliance, hence Islamic
investors will still be willing to buy the Islamic securities regardless all surrounded
controversies. If regulators could carry out this role effectively, any potential demand for
Islamic securities could be materialized.
Some quantitative studies try to investigate whether Islamic investors are
convinced on the sharia compliance of Islamic securities and whether they are willing to
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buy current Islamic securities or to utilize services offered by Islamic financial
institutions. If Islamic investors are willing to buy Islamic securities or utilize Islamic
services, we can observe that Islamic securities/institutions will have greater market
power compare to the conventional securities/institutions.
Weill (2010) compares market power of Islamic banks and conventional banks in
the 17 countries over the period 2000-2007 to investigate whether Islamic banks have
greater power because they have unique “religious” clients. He finds no significant
different on market power between Islamic and conventional banks. Surprisingly when
controlling other variables, he finds that market power of Islamic banks was weaker than
conventional banks due to the differences in norms and incentives applied across the
bank’s type. Godlewski, Ariss, and Weill (2010) study how stock markets respond to the
issuances of sukuk and conventional bonds.
Using a sample of Malaysian listed company which issued both sukuk and
conventional bonds over the period 2002-2009, they find that stock market reacted
neutrally to the conventional bond issuance, but reacted negatively to the sukuk issuance.
They argue that market perceived that only less healthy companies prefer sukuk than
conventional bonds due to the classic adverse selection problem. They also argue that
sukuk enjoyed greater market demand compared to conventional bonds; especially sukuk
could meet excess liquidity in the Malaysian Islamic banks.
To enrich quantitative studies regarding market power of Islamic securities, in
this paper, we want provide a discussion whether Islamic securities enjoy larger demands
than conventional securities. We also investigate whether regulator could effectively take
a role in materializing demands for Islamic securities and whether regulator declaration is
more convincing than sharia compliance declaration by another institution.
Utilizing the first Issuance of the list of Islamic securities (DES) by the
Indonesian capital market and financial institution supervisory agency (Bapepam-LK),
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we categorize securities into three groups: Islamic securities, new Islamic securities, and
non Islamic securities, then we run different in different (DID) regression and also
estimate cumulative abnormal returns by employing the standard market model for
robustness test. We find that market react to sharia compliance announcement by
regulator in the long run (3 months), hence Islamic securities will enjoy greater market
power. We also find that market do not perceive differently regulator declaration and
another institution declaration. Investors still consider securities as Islamic securities even
though there were conflicting opinions regarding sharia compliance between regulator
and another institution.
2. Methodology
We only consider stocks in this paper since the price data of the other securities is
not freely available. We also consider only the first and the second issuance of DES
because in that period, becoming Islamic or conventional stock is independent from any
company actions.42 In the following periods, companies could adjust their financial ratios
to comply with Bapepam-LK regulation to be included in the DES (endogeniety problem)
and IDX also immediately adjust the stocks listed in the JII following the issuance of
DES (no different opinion on the sharia compliance exist for considerably long period).
We collect data of stock prices and trading volume from the Yahoo Finance. We
exclude 15 stocks which their type is changed (Included in first DES, but not included in
second DES, and vice versa). Our population consists of 116 new Islamic securities, 182
non Islamic securities, and 30 stocks (Islamic securities) included in the Jakarta Islamic
securities (JII). The new Islamic securities are defined as stocks which are included in
42The first and the second DES were issued on September 12th and November 30th, 2007 respectively. These
DES were issued base on Bapepam-LK rule Number IX.K.1 which was issued on August 31th, 2007. The first and the
second DES was composed base on already published financial statements, annual report 2006 and semiannual report 2007.
Therefore, company could do nothing to be included in the DES. Hence, strictly exogenous assumption on least squared
regression could be fulfilled.
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DES, but not in JII. The non Islamic securities are defined as stocks which are not
included both in DES and JII.
As sample, we randomly take from the population 30 new Islamic securities, 40
non Islamic securities, and 29 Islamic securities (data of 1 company included in JII is not
available in the Yahoo Finance). We categorize further 29 Islamic securities into two
groups: stock included both in DES and JII, and stock included in JII, but not in DES.
To measure immediate, medium and long-term market response to the issuance
of DES, we employ simple differences in differences (DID) regression using the
following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) specification:
(1)
where denotes cumulative return of stock i at time t. R is calculated in three different
periods: immediate, medium, and long-term period which represents 1 day, 1 month, and
3 months respectively before or after the DES issuance date. In the first series of
regressions, sharia denotes a dummy variable which take value of 1 if stocks belong to
new Islamic securities group, and take value of 0 if stocks belong to non Islamic
securities group. In the second series of regressions, sharia takes value of 1 if stocks
belong to group of stocks which include in JII, but not in DES, and sharia takes value of 0
if stocks belong to group of stocks which included both in JII and DES. T is also a
dummy variable which take value of 1 if observations come from period after the DES
issuance date, otherwise it take value of 0. X represents two control variables, trading
volume and standard deviation of daily returns. This specification allows the stocks
response depends on a set of control variables, for examples the response may correlated
with the stock risks or trading volume.
In the first series of regressions, we want to investigate whether new Islamic
securities (stocks included in DES) gain more market power relative to non Islamic
securities. In other words, we regard new Islamic securities as treated group and non
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Islamic securities as control group. In the second series of regression, we want to
investigate the market response to different opinion regarding sharia compliance. We
treat group of stocks which included in JII, but not included in DES as treated group, and
group of stocks which included both in JII and DES as control group. We do not utilize
non Islamic securities as control group to avoid selection bias, since JII only includes
stocks which have the biggest market capitalization and the highest liquidity.
We are mainly interested in which capture the net effects of DES issuance,
controlling for time-invariant characteristics among groups and differences in the stocks
response across time. Formally, could be written as:
(2)
Since number of observation in the second series of regressions is not large, we
also estimate cumulative abnormal returns using the standard market model to check the
robustness of our results. Let denote stock return of company i on day t and
denote market return on day t, we estimate α and β for each stock using daily stock
returns from January to June 2007 (the last observations are about 2.5 months before the
issuance of DES) using the regression:43
(3)
Then, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each stock are estimates as follow:
= [ ] – 1 - [ ] – 1} (4)
Where h is beginning of event window, H is the end of event window, and h=0 is the date
when 1st DES was issued.
43 Specification of Equations 3 and 4 follows Dellavigna and Polet (2009).
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3. Result and Discussion
3.1. Islamic securities in Indonesia
Development of Islamic capital market in Indonesia began with the issuance of
Islamic mutual fund by PT Danareksa Investment Management (DIM) on July 3rd, 1997.
Then on July 3rd, 2000, the Indonesia stock exchange (IDX, formerly known as Jakarta
stock exchange) in collaboration with DIM launched the first JII which consisted of 30
Islamic stocks. There were four criteria for stocks to be included in JII:
1. The Company does not conduct any business activities that conflict with sharia;
2. The liability to asset ratio in the annual or semi-annual financial report is not more
than 90 percent;
3. From the list of companies which comply with the first two criteria, the 60 largest
companies according to market capitalization are chosen;
4. Finally, from the list of 60 companies above, the 30 largest companies according to
average daily trading values are included in JII.
Meanwhile, the sukuk development was started by the issuance of mudharabah
sukuk by PT Indosat on September 2002. However, the milestone of sukuk development
was the stipulation of the law number 19 regarding government Islamic bond on May 7th,
2008, which followed by the first issuance of government sukuk on August 26th, 2008.
One important regulator role in developing Islamic capital market is to ensure
sharia compliance of Islamic securities and to convince investors regarding this
compliance. Bapepam-LK carries out this role by publishing semiannually the list of
Islamic securities (DES). DES was firstly issued on September 12th, 2007 which was
composed based on the annual financial statements 2006, and followed by the issuance of
second DES on November 30th, 2007 which was composed based on semiannual financial
statements 2007. DES consists of sukuk, stocks, mutual funds, asset backed securities,
and other Islamic securities.
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According to Bapepam-LK rules Number IX.K.1regarding criteria and issuance
of DES, there are criteria that should be fulfilled by companies for their stocks to be
included on the DES, as follow:
1. The Company does not conduct any business activities conflicting with sharia as
stipulated on Bapepam-LK rules Number IX.A.13 regarding the issuance of Islamic
securities such as:
a. Gambling and games considered as gambling;
b. Trading that is prohibited according to sharia, such as trading that is not followed
by transfer of products or services, and trading with a fake offer;
c. Interest based (ribawi) financial services;
d. Buying and selling of risks that involve speculation (gharar) and gambling
(maisir);
e. Producing, distributing, and trading products or services that are forbidden
because of its contents (haram li-dzatihi) or stated forbidden (haram li-ghairi)
by Islamic scholars council (MUI), or that can degrade morals and are harmful;
f. Transactions that contain elements of bribery (risywah).
2. The Company has the following financial ratios:
a. The ratio of interest-based liabilities to total equity is not more than 82 percent;
b. The ratio non-sharia income to total revenue is not more than 10 percent.
Table 1 Summary of the Data New Islamic Securities
Variables No.
Obs
Before Announcement After Announcement
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
New Islamic securities
1 day returns 30 -3.0% 11.8% 0.5% 3.7%
1 month returns 30 -8.6% 16.9% 3.5% 18.5%
3 months returns 30 -15.5% 25.9% 1.7% 32.3%
1 month risks 30 6.6% 5.5% 5.0% 5.0%
3 months risks 30 6.4% 4.6% 5.3% 3.5%
1 day trading volume 30 30.3 105.0 28.6 129.0
1 month’s average trading volume 30 21.2 53.7 29.3 78.4
3 month’s average trading volume 30 23.2 56.4 21.5 54.1
Note: trading volume is in a million.
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Table 2 Summary of the Data Non Islamic Securities
Variables No.
Obs
Before Announcement After Announcement
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Non Islamic securities
1 day returns 40 0.5% 10.8% 2.7% 10.5%
1 month returns 40 -6.6% 28.7% 2.3% 20.3%
3 months returns 40 -6.7% 51.4% -14.3% 33.7%
1 month risks 40 9.1% 6.7% 6.5% 6.5%
3 months risks 40 8.4% 6.0% 7.5% 6.2%
1 day trading volume 40 9.2 24.6 21.8 97.2
1 month’s average trading volume 40 10.3 42.0 13.6 57.4
3 month’s average trading volume 40 9.9 37.7 11.6 48.5
Table 3 Summary of the Data Stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index
Variables No.
Obs
Before Announcement After Announcement
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index
1 day returns 29 0.2% 1.6% 1.4% 2.8%
1 month returns 29 -2.3% 7.2% 20.0% 11.7%
3 months returns 29 -0.8% 17.6% 48.8% 77.0%
1 month risks 29 4.0% 1.5% 2.2% 0.7%
3 months risks 29 3.2% 1.0% 3.5% 3.8%
1 day trading volume 29 19.6 35.3 13.7 22.8
1 month’s average trading volume 29 34.9 48.5 35.8 42.8
3 month’s average trading volume 29 38.3 49.2 36.8 44.6
Table 1 until Table 3 provides summary statistic of variables utilized in our
analysis. Comparing data before and after the issuance of the first DES, all variables after
the issuance were higher meaning that Indonesian stock exchange was in the upward
trend. New Islamic securities group consistently underperformed non Islamic securities
group before the issuance of DES, however 1 month after the issuance of DES, new
Islamic securities began to over perform non Islamic securities group. Meanwhile, JII
group were the best performer. Overtime, they also grew quicker than others. It is not
surprising because only the best performer (the biggest market capitalization and the most
liquid stock) to be included in the JII. Therefore, JII could not directly be compared with
other groups because of this selection bias.
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Table 4 The Effects of Sharia Compliance Declaration on Previously Non Islamic Securities
Immediate response Medium-term response Long-term response
1 2 3 4 5 6
1.005***
(0.017)
1.003***
(0.017)
0.934***
(0.046)
1.067***
(0.041)
0.933***
(0.081)
1.247***
(0.095)
-0.035
(0.028)
-0.038
(0.028)
-0.020
(0.055)
-0.065
(0.047)
-0.088
(0.094)
-0.178**
(0.083)
0.022
(0.024)
0.023
(0.024)
0.090
(0.056)
0.051
(0.053)
-0.076
(0.097)
-0.167
(0.115)
0.012
(0.033)
0.016
(0.033)
0.032
(0.072)
0.039
(0.060)
0.249**
(0.123)
0.240**
(0.103)
1.74E-10**
(6.78E-11)
6.17E-10*
(3.44E-10)
1.02E-09*
(6.08E-10)
-1.13E-10
(7.88E-11)
2.28E-10
(4.41E-10)
1.41E-09
(1.10E-09)
-1.530***
(0.521)
-3.862***
(0.518)
-0.100
(0.607)
0.505
(0.708)
Number of
observation
140 140 140 140 140 140
R-square 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.03 0.37
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression with robust standard error; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1% significance level; Standard errors are in ().
Table 4 provides regression results for the DID analysis. In this regression, we
consider new Islamic securities as a treated group and non Islamic securities as a control
group. We are mainly interested in which capture the net effects of DES issuance
controlling for time-invariant characteristics among groups and differences in the stocks
response across time. Column 1 and 2 provide immediate market response to the issuance
of DES. Immediate response is 1 day market response after the issuance of the first DES.
Coefficients are positive even after controlling for trading volume, but statistically not
significant different from 0.
Column 3 and 4 provide the medium-term market response which is defined as 1
month market response to the issuance of DES. Like in immediate response, Coefficients
are also positive even after controlling for trading volume and stock risks, but
statistically not significant different from 0. Column 5 and 6 provide long-term market
response to the DES issuance which is defined as 3 months market response. Coefficients
are 0.25 without controlling stock risks and trading volume and 0.24 with controlling
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for both stock risks and trading volume. These coefficients are significant at 5 percent
significance level. This result implies that by included in DES, previously non-Islamic
securities could gain more market power. Quantitatively, their stock prices, which also
represent a whole company market value, will increase by 24-25 percent.
Table 5 The Effects of Non Sharia Declaration on Current Islamic Securities
Immediate response Medium-term response Long-term response
1 2 3 4 5 6
1.001***
(0.004)
0.999***
(0.005)
0.974***
(0.014)
1.066***
(0.021)
0.977***
(0.029)
1.300***
(0.102)
0.003
(0.006)
0.002
(0.005)
0.008
(0.029)
-0.006
(0.026)
0.036
(0.074)
0.020
(0.065)
0.012
(0.008)
0.013
(0.009)
0.226***
(0.031)
-0.097
(0.059)
0.575***
(0.241)
-0.552***
(0.134)
0.002
(0.012)
0.002
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.054)
0.004
(0.043)
-0.190
(0.266)
0.004
(0.119)
1.10E-10
(8.44E-11)
5.91E-10
(4.32E-10)
9.24E-10
(1.02E-09)
-4.86E-11
(2.88E-10)
2.08E-10
(6.46E-10)
3.66E-10
(1.44E-09)
-2.647***
(0.913)
-10.859***
(3.454)
11.775***
(2.425)
30.120***
(3.495)
Number of
observation
58 58 58 58 58 58
R-square 0.02 0.09 0.58 0.74 0.18 0.88
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression with robust standard errors; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%significance level; Standard errors are in ().
The above results are statistically only significant in the long term due to the
variation on the speed response from different market players. We argue that individual
investors could adjust their stock allocation more freely, while institutional investors
should pass several procedures to adjust their investment policy or to raise additional
funds to respond the new sharia investment opportunities. Therefore, in the short and
medium run, we could only observe responses from individual Islamic investors. As
investment values of the individual investors are not large compared to the institutional
investors, we could only see small increase in stock price of the new Islamic securities by
about 1.4 percent in the short-run and 3.5 percent in the medium-run.
Table 5 provides regression results to investigate the market response to different
opinions regarding the sharia compliance. We treat group of stocks which included in JII,
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but not included in DES as a treated group, and group of stocks which included both in
JII and DES as a control group. We expect that coefficients are negative meaning that
company will lose some market powers when its stock are not included in DES
(considered as non Islamic securities by regulator), even though its stocks are still
included in JII (still considered as Islamic securities by another institution). Columns 1-2,
3-4, and 5-6 provide regressions for market response in short, medium, and long-term
respectively. Coefficients in all regressions are not statistically different from 0. It
means that market does not response to the issuance of DES which implies that market
does not perceive differently these two groups. We argue that investors still consider JII’s
stocks which not included in DES as Islamic securities.
Since our sample in the second series of regressions is not large (there are only 29
stocks in JII available for our analysis), we estimate CAR to check robustness of our
results. Table 4 provides short-run CAR which is estimated as a product of daily
abnormal returns over the respective event window. We estimate one day [0,0], three
days [-1,+1], and five days [+2,+2] event windows. We also incorporate four days event
windows, [-1,+2] and [-2,+1]. These specifications allow for the possibilities that
abnormal returns are realized before the DES issuance date as common practice in
developing markets (Godlewski, Ariss, and Weill, 2010). We find that CARs in all event
windows are not statistically significant different from zero for both groups meaning that
there were no statistically significant market response in the short-run, even though some
JII’s stocks were not included in the DES.
Table 6 Short-run Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
Event
Window
Type of Securities CAR Std. T-
value
P-
value
[0,0] Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
-1.23% 2.13% -0.578 0.572
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
-0.02% 2.10% -0.008 0.994
[-1,1] Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
-0.85% 2.99% -0.283 0.781
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Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
1.70% 3.62% 0.469 0.649
[-2,2] Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
-0.97% 2.63% -0.370 0.717
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
2.90% 4.22% 0.686 0.508
[-1,2] Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
-0.76% 2.94% -0.260 0.799
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
2.24% 4.51% 0.496 0.631
[-2,1] Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and included
in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
-1.05% 2.74% -0.384 0.706
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
2.37% 3.51% 0.675 0.515
Event of 0 means the day when the 1st DES was issued (September 12, 2007); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1% significance level.
Table 7 provides estimated CAR in the longer period. We estimate CAR over six
periods: 1 day, 5 days, 10 days, 1 month, 2 months, and 3 months after the first DES
issuance date. Columns 5 and 6 shows that CAR over six different periods are not
statistically different from zero meaning that there were no statistically significant market
response in the long-run. It also means that market did not differentiate between group of
stocks which included in JII, but not included in DES, and group of stocks which
included both in JII and DES. This result is consistent with results of DID analysis and
the short-run CAR.
Our results provide evidence that Islamic investors are not too strict in screening
Islamic securities and are willing to accept different opinions regarding product’s sharia
compliance. It could also imply that market seems not to presume regulator declaration
stronger than sharia declaration by another institution. This result means that not only
regulator but also other stake holders (SROs, research institution, private companies, etc.)
could carry out the role in materializing potential demand for Islamic securities by
making declaration that Islamic securities do comply with Islamic principles.
Table 7 Long-run Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
Time after
DES issued
Type of Securities CAR Std. T-
value
P-
value
1 day Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
0.51% 2.62% 0.193 0.849
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
1.50% 3.30% 0.453 0.660
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5 day Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
0.54% 3.00% 0.181 0.859
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
1.45% 4.90%
0.295
0.774
10 day Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
0.11% 4.08% 0.027 0.979
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
3.37% 6.84% 0.492 0.633
1 month Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
0.15% 7.99% 0.018 0.986
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
2.02% 12.01
%
0.168 0.870
2 months Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
8.03% 32.32
%
0.248 0.807
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
8.53% 24.31
%
0.351 0.733
3 months Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), and
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
29.37
%
98.66
%
0.298 0.770
Islamic stocks in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), but not
included in the List of Islamic Securities (DES)
13.38
%
29.53
%
0.453 0.660
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% significance level.
4. Conclusions
Utilizing the first issuance of DES on September 2007, we categorize securities
into three groups: Islamic securities, new Islamic securities, and non Islamic securities,
then we employ DID regression to see immediate, medium, and long term market
response on this announcement. We also estimate cumulative abnormal returns by
employing the standard market model for the robustness test.
We find that market reacts to sharia compliance declaration by regulator in the
long run, hence potential demands are realized and Islamic securities will enjoy greater
market power by about 24-25 percent. We also argue that only individual investors could
react in the short and medium run, because institutional investors still need time to adjust
their investment policy or to raise funds to grab the new sharia investment opportunities.
As investment values of the individual investors are not too large compared to the
institutional investors, we could only observe small and insignificant increase in stock
price of the new Islamic securities by about 1.4 percent in the sort-run and 3.5 percent in
the medium-run.
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We also find that investors are less strict than our expectation. We argue that
Islamic investors still consider securities as Islamic securities even though there were
conflicting opinions regarding their sharia compliance. This finding could explain why
Islamic finance is still growing rapidly even though many scholars criticize that current
Islamic financial products/services do not really comply with sharia. This finding also
implies that investors do not perceive differently sharia compliance declaration by
regulator with sharia compliance declaration by another institution, meaning that market
do not presume regulator declarations are stronger or more valid. Therefore, other
stakeholders could also carry out regulator’s role in realizing potential demand for
Islamic securities by declaring that securities do comply with sharia.
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